USA v. Johnson by unknown
2006 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-14-2006 
USA v. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Johnson" (2006). 2006 Decisions. 456. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/456 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
Nos. 05-3856 and 05-3960
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEFFREY JOHNSON,
                                Appellant in No. 05-3856
and
JAMES PHILLIPS,
                                Appellant in No. 05-3960
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. Nos. 00-cr-00419-3 and 00-cr-00419-8)
District Judge: Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno
            
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 11, 2006
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  September 14, 2006 )
             
OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
1  “[A] simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or
contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales agreement itself,
is insufficient to establish that the buyer was a member of the
seller’s conspiracy.”  United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d
2
Appellants Jeffrey Johnson and James Phillips were convicted of involvement in a
drug-related conspiracy and Phillips was also convicted of substantive drug offenses. 
They appeal the order of the District Court denying their renewed motion for a new trial
based upon (1) Brady violations and (2) newly discovered evidence.
I.
Appellants’ jury trial was held in December 2000.  The trial centered on a drug
distribution conspiracy run by Leon Hunt, Gregory Hunt and Jeffrey Hunt (the
“Conspiracy”).  The Conspiracy sold cocaine base (“crack”) in the area of the Spring
Garden Apartments (a public housing facility owned and operated by the Philadelphia
Housing Authority (PHA)).  Trial focused on the time period between March 1999 and
January 2000.  The Conspiracy sold crack in clear plastic gel caps, gel caps labeled
“357,” and sections of vinyl or plastic tubing plugged with cork or wooden dowels.  The
most disputed issue at trial was whether Appellants were in fact members of the
Conspiracy.
A. Distinguishing the Conspiracy
The Government sought to provide the jury with the basis to distinguish a member
of the Conspiracy from a non-conspirator in a mere “buyer-seller” relationship with the
Conspiracy.1  In its opening statement, the Government stated that “this group would
Cir. 1999). 
*  Consistent with Johnson’s brief, references to the
appendix pages preceded by an “A” refer to the appendix filed with
Johnson’s prior appeal before this Court (No. 02-1500); the
references labeled “App.” refer to the appendix filed with the
instant appeal.  See Johnson’s Br. at 1.
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distinguish itself by using [two] typical business techniques,” A844,* namely: (1) selling
crack in “a general target area” around the Spring Garden Apartments, and (2) marketing
it in a “unique packaging.”  A845.  The Government described the “unique packaging” as
follows:
[From at least March 1999 to the fall of the same year,] the
defendants were selling the crack cocaine package[d] in little
clear gel caps, gel capsules, sort of like what you see in a
Contac pill and the crack would be inside there.  And that
would be the unique packaging that this group would use to
sell the crack cocaine.  And oftentimes those gel capsules
were labeled with 357, which meant three rocks for $5 on 7th
Street, so that each capsule would be sold for $5.
. . . . [T]he packaging changed in about the fall of
1999, and what this group started using were tubes, like tubes
that would be cut and the drugs would be put inside the tube
and wooden dowels would be placed at each end to close up
the tube . . . .
A845; see also App. at 31.
Rashael Harris, a/k/a Rochelle Ross (“Harris”), testified pursuant to a plea
agreement with the government that she sold crack cocaine in clear gel caps and gel caps
labeled “357” for the Conspiracy.  She also testified that “the cocaine was packaged in the
4clear caps and the 357 labels” because “[i]t was something different, something to
separate it from anybody else’s from around there.”  A1273.  Harris testified that people
not involved in the Conspiracy were selling in the area where she sold but “they were
selling cocaine packets in other ways . . . .”  A1288.  Similarly, Corporal John Rodriguez
of the Philadelphia Police Department testified at trial that what made the gel capsules
sold by the Conspiracy distinctive was the fact that there was a “357 on these little
capsules . . . . and the fact that [the drugs] were contained in those plastic capsules
initially.”  A1139.
Undercover Officer Christina Goodwin-Laws of the Philadelphia Police
Department testified that distribution of crack in clear gel caps occurred only in the region
where the Conspiracy was based.  She testified that she and Officer Israel Morales
purchased four gel caps of crack from Johnson near the Spring Garden Apartments on
May 13, 1999; two of these gel caps were marked with “357” while two were clear and
unmarked.
Philadelphia police officer Leslie Simmons testified that in her experience crack-
packed gel capsules generally (“not just the [capsules marked with] 357”) did not “exist
anywhere else in the City of Philadelphia.”  A1010.  She testified that both the capsules
themselves and the “357” marking were “indigenous to the [region of the Conspiracy].” 
A1010.  Police undercover officer Richard L. Cujdik of the Philadelphia Police
Department testified that “[d]ue to the packaging” of the drugs in the Conspiracy area, the
“whole area was considered part of Jeffrey Hunt’s organization.”  A1090.
5The Government argued to the jury during its rebuttal closing
argument that no group other than the Conspiracy sold crack in clear gel caps:
The packaging was unique to the [Conspiracy] area, the caps
both marked and unmarked and the gelcaps.  Three
experienced narcotics officers told you that. . . . There’s no
evidence that any other group was selling even the clear
gelcaps anywhere else.  It was here. . . . [T]here was [sic]
other sales in that area but no one else but this group was
selling the gelcaps . . . . That’s what it tells you and you don’t
have to be an expert to know that.
A1586-87.
B. Distinguishing Johnson as a Member of the Conspiracy
In order to link Johnson to the Conspiracy, the Government presented evidence
tending to show that Johnson: (1) bought drugs from members of the Conspiracy, and (2)
sold drugs in gel caps (both marked and unmarked) and dowel-stopped tubing.  Rashael
Harris’s testimony provided the Government’s only evidence that Johnson purchased
drugs from the Conspiracy.  Harris testified that she saw Johnson “[g]etting his packs”
from the Conspiracy’s distribution location approximately “three or four or five times a
week.”  A1277.  Harris testified that this frequency of purchase was “[n]ot much,” but did
not testify why she thought three to five visits per week was infrequent.  A1277.
With regard to Johnson’s sale of drugs, the Government presented four items of
evidence.  First, Harris testified that she couldn’t “recall the date, [but] between July and
September [1999]” she bought crack from Johnson packaged in “gelcaps” in the
Conspiracy’s area of operation.  A1281-83.  Second, on May 13, 1999, Officer Goodwin-
6Laws testified that she and Officer Morales purchased four gel caps of crack from
Johnson, two of which were clear and two of which were marked with “357.” 
Furthermore, Officer Cujdik testified that shortly thereafter five additional gel caps filled
with crack and marked “357” were recovered from a windowsill near the location where
Johnson had been dealing.  Third, Officer Harold Poles testified that, on September 20,
1999, Johnson was arrested in the Conspiracy’s area in possession of twenty clear gel
caps of crack cocaine.  Fourth, Officer Harry Wenger testified that, on November 6, 1999,
Johnson was arrested in the same area, again in possession of twenty clear gel caps, but
also in possession of crack packed in sections of tubing stopped with cork dowels.
C. Distinguishing Phillips as a Member of the Conspiracy
In order to link Phillips to the Conspiracy, the Government presented evidence
tending to show that he: (1) bought drugs from members of the Conspiracy, and (2) sold
drugs in tubes stopped with wooden dowels.  Rashael Harris’s testimony provided the
Government’s only evidence that Phillips purchased drugs from the Conspiracy.  At first,
Harris testified that “during the time that [she was] . . . selling cocaine for Jeffrey Hunt,”
she “[saw] Phillips at 622 Franklin Place” (a Conspiracy distribution point) “[a]bout three
or four times out of the week,” but that she “didn’t see him picking up any packs [of
crack].”  A1279.  However, she later testified that when she saw Phillips at 622 Franklin
Place she witnessed “him come out of the house with a pack [of crack].”  A1280.
As to Phillips’s sale of drugs, the Government presented two items of evidence. 
First, Rashael Harris testified that, “during the latter part of 1999,” she purchased crack
2  Phillips was additionally convicted of distributing cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and of distributing
cocaine base within one thousand feet of a public housing facility
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860.  All substantive counts against
Johnson were dismissed by order dated December 13, 2000.
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from Phillips “[o]nce” in the courtyard of the Spring Garden Apartments, and that it was
contained in vials with “[wooden] ends.”  A1283.  Second, Officer Goodwin-Laws
testified that, on December 14, 1999, she witnessed Phillips sell items to a confidential
informant which, in a later search of that informant, were found to be four sections of
tubing stopped with cork dowels.  She then provided a description of Phillips to backup
officers, who apprehended Phillips ten minutes later.  Corporal Rodriguez testified that he
stopped Phillips based on Goodwin-Laws’s description and found in Phillips’s mouth five
plastic tubes stopped with wooden corks and containing crack.
D. The Discovery of Suppressed and New Evidence
Both Johnson and Phillips were convicted of conspiracy to distribute over fifty
grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.2  The jury returned a supplemental
verdict finding that the amount of cocaine base attributable to the Conspiracy amounted
to fifty or more grams.  The District Court denied Appellants’ motions for judgment of
acquittal or new trial.  United States v. Hunt, No. 00-419, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2642, at
*18-19 (E.D. Pa. March 14, 2001), aff’d, 47 F.App’x 174 (3d Cir. 2002), and Appellants
appealed their convictions and sentences.
While the appeals were pending, Johnson filed a second motion for new trial based
8in part on a Brady claim and newly discovered evidence.  This Brady claim was based
upon the following three items of allegedly suppressed evidence:  (1) a homicide file
related to the death of Odell Priest which contained a police report referring to the
discovery of a number of crack-containing gelcaps labeled “187” in the Spring Garden
Apartments, (2) Gregory Hunt’s testimony at Johnson’s sentencing hearing, which
suggested that people not associated with the Conspiracy were selling crack at the Spring
Garden Apartments in clear, unmarked gelcaps, and (3) a post-trial letter from the
Government tending to show that “187”-marked gelcaps were prevalent around the
Spring Garden Apartments and that Rashael Harris and Gregory Hunt had both told the
Government that dealers not in the Conspiracy were using gel caps in the vicinity.  The
District Court denied the motion and proceeded to sentence Appellants.
This court affirmed the District Court’s judgments of conviction and sentence on
November 12, 2003, stating that we had considered “all of the other issues raised by
appellants, and [found] them to be without merit.”  United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d
138, 143 (3d Cir. 2003).  We rejected Johnson’s argument “that the District Court erred
when it failed to grant a new trial based on . . . newly discovered evidence[] and . . . a
Brady violation.”  Id. at 143 n.5.
On December 19, 2003, Appellants filed the renewed motion for new trial that is
the subject of the present appeal.  As the District Court stated, they raised the following
eight items of alleged Brady evidence:
1. The discovery of gel caps bearing “187” labels, recovered by a partner of
9one of the witnesses who testified, during the homicide investigation, at the
housing project in question, during the course of the conspiracy;
 
2. The discovery of other drugs packaged in gel caps, bearing the “187”
label, based upon other police reports of the Philadelphia Police
Department;
 
3. The substance of the information contained within the handwritten notes
of the prosecutor assigned to the case, in the course of pre-trial preparation
of [Harris] that other drug distributors, at the housing project in question,
during the course of the conspiracy, were utilizing gel caps to package their
crack cocaine;
 
4. The substance of the information contained within the handwritten notes
of the prosecutor assigned to the case, in the course of a proffer of Gregory
Hunt, a leader of the alleged conspiracy and government cooperator, that
other crack cocaine dealers were distributing their drugs packaged in gel
caps;
5. Information from the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department
that during the course of the conspiracy, at the location of the conspiracy,
individuals not affiliated with the Hunt organization were peddling crack
cocaine packaged in gel capsules, with such individuals having been
identified, arrested and prosecuted by such local authorities, including, but
not limited to, the apprehension of one Dawn Benson, and the
apprehension, arrest and prosecution of one Leroy Washington for an
observed sale and possession on March 2, 1999 [in the Pennsylvania Court
of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Feb. Term, 1999, No. 802];
6. Material relative to the character of the supervisory police officer
involved in the case, Corporal John Rodriguez, who provided material
testimony at trial, namely allegations of his involvement in a theft from
drug dealer as revealed by Kenneth Spencer which was the subject of an
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
7. Material relative to the character of the supervisory police officer
involved in the case, Corporal John Rodriguez, who provided material
testimony at trial, namely allegations of his involvement in a second theft
from an alleged participant in a narcotics related transaction, as set forth in
the Roberts Report, which was the subject of an investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and which still has not been disclosed by the
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Government; and
8. Material relative to the allegation of a theft from a drug dealer, Reginald
Harris, during the course of this very investigation, involving Police
Officers Simmons and Cujdik, who provided material testimony at trial.
App. at 35-36; id. at 36-37 n.5 (noting that “Johnson’s Supplemental Memorandum,”
upon which the District Court based this list, “was submitted to the Court, but never filed
of record.”); cf. Johnson’s Br. at 36.  Appellants also argued that a new trial was
warranted on the basis of newly discovered evidence not wrongfully suppressed, namely:
9. Information from a leader of the conspiracy, Gregory Hunt that the use of
clear unmarked gel caps, by the conspirators, were exceedingly rare;
10. Information from Gregory Hunt that such use of gel caps by the
conspirators ended prior to the summer of 1999;
11. Information from Gregory Hunt that there were other, unrelated, drug
dealers operating in the area;
12. Information from Gregory Hunt that other drug dealers were using clear
gel caps and that the purpose of the “357” label was so that the Hunt gel
caps would not be confused with those of competitive dealers;
13. Identification of the “Steve,” referred to by Gregory Hunt as a dealer of
clear gel caps not affiliated with the conspirators, at the Spring Garden
Projects, as one Steven Deveraux a/k/a Steve Hopkins (his ‘partner’ Kaleef
remains unidentified); and
14. Identification of other non-Hunt organization dealers selling crack
packaged in gel caps in the geographic area in question as the “Meatloaf”
organization (including Richard Thigpen and Lionel Simmons, both of 
whom had been arrested at the time) and “Fred.”
App. at 36.
In a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, the District Court denied
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Appellants’ request for a new trial.  It concluded that only items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 were
wrongfully suppressed prior to trial.  Despite applying the lenient standard applicable to
wrongfully suppressed evidence, the District Court rejected Appellants’ Brady claim on
the ground that the items were not “material” under Brady, i.e., they did not undermine
confidence in the verdicts.  A39.  Next, the District Court rejected Appellants’ request for
a new trial based upon the fourteen items of newly discovered evidence, because it could
not “conclude that had this evidence been available prior to trial Johnson would probably
have been acquitted . . . .”  A41.  Appellants timely filed the present appeal.
II. Discussion
We “conduct a de novo review of the district court's conclusions of law as well as
a ‘clearly erroneous’ review of any findings of fact where appropriate.”  United States v.
Price, 13 F.3d 711, 722 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967,
969 (3d Cir. 1991)) (quotation marks omitted).
A. The Brady Claim
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause forbids a prosecutor from suppressing “evidence favorable to an accused 
. . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  Id. at 87.  To establish a due process violation
under Brady, a defendant must make three showings:  “(1) evidence was suppressed; (2)
the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the suppressed evidence
was material either to guilt or to punishment.”  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197,
12
209 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 199 (5th Cir. 1997))
(quotation marks omitted).
1. Favorable Evidence Wrongfully Suppressed
The Government conceded that items 3, 4, 6, and 7 were wrongfully suppressed. 
Citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the District Court also found that the
Government wrongfully failed to turn over items 1 and 2 because they constitute evidence
favorable to Appellants known to the Philadelphia Police before trial, and the
Philadelphia Police carried out a significant part of the Conspiracy investigation.  Id. 437
(explaining that the Government has a duty to learn of and disclose any favorable
evidence known to others acting on its behalf).
However, the District Court found that items 5 and 8 were not wrongfully
suppressed.  The District Court treated item 8 as non-suppressed newly discovered
evidence because Appellants conceded that it was first discovered by prosecutors more
than a year after trial.  The Court found that item 5 was not wrongfully suppressed
because there is no indication that the U.S. Attorney’s Office possessed or should have
possessed the item 5 evidence; the evidence was privy only to the Philadelphia Housing
Authority (“PHA”) and “there is no indication that prosecutors in this case and the [PHA]
‘engaged in a joint investigation or otherwise shared labor and resources,’ which would
impute possession of this information to the prosecutors.”  App. at 38 (citing Pelullo, 399
F.3d at 216).
Appellants make no argument specifically challenging the District Court’s
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conclusion as to item 8.  As to why item 5 – information collected by the PHA – should
be included, the District Court correctly noted that Appellants “have offered no evidence
to suggest that [PHA officers] were working on behalf of the United States Attorney’s
Office,” and therefore that office “had no duty to learn of or disclose information from the
[PHA].”  App. at 38.
The District Court did not err in making its well-reasoned findings that items 5 and
8 were not wrongfully suppressed.  See generally Price, 13 F.3d at 722 (“where the
district court applies the correct legal standard, its ‘weighing of the evidence merits
deference from the Court of Appeals . . . .’”) (quoting United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d
1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted).
1. Materiality
To make the third and more complicated showing under Brady (i.e., as to whether
the wrongfully suppressed evidence was “material”), a defendant must show that in the
absence of the suppressed evidence s/he did not “receive[] a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  A new trial is
mandated where there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding
would have been different if wrongfully suppressed evidence had been disclosed to the
defense.  Id.; Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 971.  “A reasonable probability [amounts to] a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Perdomo, 929 F.2d at
971 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)) (quotation marks omitted).
It is irrelevant whether Appellants would have received a different verdict if this
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evidence were not suppressed; rather, the relevant question is whether Appellants were
deprived of a fair trial because of the absence of the evidence.  See Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668, 698 (2004) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435) (explaining that the proper
question is whether the undisclosed evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict”); Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
Our review compares the totality of the evidence in this case to the conspiracy
charge under which Appellants were convicted.  Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 971; see United
States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2001) (elements of conspiracy charge).  The
Government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has “knowledge of
the illegal objective contemplated by the conspiracy.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d
318, 342 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Where “a defendant
drug buyer has repeated, familiar dealings with members of a conspiracy, that buyer
probably comprehends fully the nature of the group with whom he [or she] is
dealing . . . .”  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.  Even “an occasional buyer for redistribution[] can
be shown to be a member of the conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of
knowledge that she or he was part of a larger operation.”  Perez, 280 F.3d at 343 (quoting
Price, 13 F.3d at 728) (quotation marks omitted).
In our earlier opinion, we considered the cumulative effect of items 1, 2, 3, and 4
and concluded that this evidence was not material to Johnson’s conspiracy convictions. 
Phillips, 349 F.3d at 143 n.5.  The same assessment was not made as to Phillips because
3  There is no contention that Phillips has waived his right
to raise the issues presently on appeal by failing to join Johnson’s
first motion.
15
he was not a party to Johnson’s first motion for a new trial.3  In any event, items 1, 2, 3,
and 4 tend to exculpate Phillips to a lesser extent than Johnson because they apply only to
testimony concerning gel caps, and Phillips was caught selling crack in vinyl tubing.
As this court previously explained, items 1, 2, 3, and 4 fail to meet the Brady
materiality standard.  Although items 1 and 2 support an inference that another conspiracy
operated in the area of the Conspiracy, the Government did not argue at trial that other
conspiracies were not present in the area.  Johnson argues that items 3 and 4 undermine
the Government’s argument to the jury that “crack cocaine package[d] in little clear gel
caps, gel capsules . . . . would be the unique packaging that [the Conspiracy] would use to
sell the crack cocaine.”  A845; Johnson’s Br. at 45-51.  However, even if clear gel caps
were not “unique” to the Conspiracy, the exculpatory evidence does not disturb trial
testimony that clear gel caps were one method by which the Conspiracy packaged crack. 
Therefore, evidence that Johnson sold both “357” gel caps and clear gel caps is consistent
with his being a conspirator.  As to Phillips, this evidence is not even exculpatory because
he was caught selling crack in dowel-stopped vinyl tubing, not clear gel caps.
Nor could Harris have been directly impeached with item 3.  We agree with the
District Court that Harris’s testimony that the Conspiracy sold crack in unmarked and
“357”-marked gel caps to distinguish its drugs is not inconsistent with item 3 because
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“[Harris] was never asked, and therefore she never testified, as to whether Non-Hunt
members also used gel caps to package their drugs.”  App. at 40.  She only testified that
non-conspirator dealers sold crack “in other ways.”  App. at 40-41.
Finally, Appellants suggest that item 3 could have served the added purpose of
impeaching Harris’s character for truthfulness.  Harris’s cross-examination was already
extraordinarily damning, and it is highly unlikely that further impeachment of her
character would have had any effect on the jury’s opinion of her.  For example, she
openly stated on cross examination that she had used $50-$100 of crack per day since the
age of 16, had prostituted herself for crack for 5 years, and was high during most if not all
of the times she testified seeing Appellants picking up crack from the Hunts. Furthermore,
she admitted that she knew the Government would drastically reduce her sentence in
exchange for favorable testimony, and was desperate to do anything she had to do to
assure that she would get as little jail time as possible and not be separated from her
children.
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the added value of items 6 and 7 to items 1,
2, 3, and 4 has the “cumulative effect” of undermining our confidence in Appellants’
verdicts.  Kyles, 514 U.S. 437 n.10; United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir.
1996).  Items 6 and 7 could serve to impeach the credibility of Corporal Rodriguez.
(Rodriguez’s relevant testimony was that the use of gel caps, both marked and unmarked,
was unique to the Conspiracy, and that he arrested Phillips based on Officer Goodwin-
Laws’s description.).  First, items 6 and 7 are of limited exculpatory value for the same
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reasons as items 3 and 4:  they tend to establish that the Conspiracy was not the only
conspiracy selling clear gel caps of crack, but do not suggest that the Conspiracy did not
sell crack in clear gel caps.  Second, even if Rodriguez’s testimony had been completely
discredited based upon items 6 and 7, the jury would still have had before it the testimony
of Officer Goodwin-Laws, who witnessed Phillips selling crack to a confidential
informant, as well as that of Rashael Harris, who saw Phillips at the Conspiracy
distribution point several times a week.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the cumulative effect of items 1, 2, 3,
and 4 does not undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict.
B. Newly Discovered Evidence
Appellants argue that a new trial must be granted under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33 based on items 1-14, which include six items of newly discovered evidence
not claimed to be Brady evidence.  To determine whether a new trial must be granted on
the basis of newly discovered evidence we “apply the following five-part test”: 
(a) the evidence must be, in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since
trial; (b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on
the part of the movant; (c) evidence relied on must not be merely
cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to the issues involved;
and (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly
discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.
United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and punctuation
omitted).
Most of the newly discovered evidence suggests that the Conspiracy most often
18
did not use clear gel caps to package drugs after the spring of 1999.  Furthermore, it is
uncontested that almost all of the crack recovered from Johnson was packaged in clear gel
caps.  However, crack was recovered from Johnson packaged in “357”-marked gel caps
and dowel-stopped vinyl tubing, and Phillips was caught selling crack only in dowel-
stopped tubing.  Substantial evidence presented at trial supported the inference that these
packaging methods were unique to the Conspiracy.
Assuming arguendo that the clear gel caps recovered from Johnson originated from
a non-conspirator dealer, this evidence does not suggest Johnson was not selling for the
Conspiracy; rather, it supports the inference that he was selling for the Conspiracy and
also acquiring crack from other sources.  As to Phillips, the evidence demonstrates that he
was selling crack only in dowel-stopped tubing; as such, nearly all of the newly
discovered evidence is completely unavailing to his newly discovered evidence claim.
With regard to item 8, Appellants implicate Officers Simmons and Cujdik in a
theft from a drug dealer.  The District Court noted that this evidence would have been
inadmissible at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) because it is not probative of
truthfulness.  Even if it were admissible under Rule 608(b), the District Court continued,
it would not be admissible under Rule 403 because its probative value would be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice due to the fact that allegations
of the Officers’ theft have never been substantiated.  We add that even if item 8 were
admitted despite Rules 403 and 608, no factfinder could reasonably disregard the
Officers’ testimony based on their purported involvement in the alleged theft.
Because the evidence forming the basis on which the jury convicted Appellants
was only slightly disturbed by the newly discovered evidence they proffered, we cannot
conclude that the newly discovered evidence they presented would probably have
produced an acquittal.
III.
We will affirm the judgments of the court below denying Appellants a new trial.
